

**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA**  
**HOLDEN AT NDOLA**  
(Civil Jurisdiction)

**APPEAL NO. 324/2023**

**BETWEEN:**

**UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA ZAMBIA**

**APPELLANT**

**AND**

**M. NDALAMA ENTERPRISES LIMITED**

**RESPONDENT**



**Coram: Chashi, Makungu and Sharpe-Phiri, JJA**  
**On the 12<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2024**

*For the Appellant: Mr. F. Mudenda of Chonta Musaila and Pindani*  
*Advocates*

*For the Respondent: Mr. B. Mosha of Mosha & Co*

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**JUDGMENT**

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**MAKUNGU JA**, delivered the judgment of the Court.

**Case referred to:**

1. *Rollop and Colls Limited v. Northwest Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board* (1973) 2 ALL ER 260
2. *African Banking Corporation Zambia Limited v. Plynth Technical Works Limited & 7 Others* (2015) 2 ZR 458
3. *Wootton v. Central Land Board* (1957) 1All ER
4. *BP Zambia PLC v. Expendito Chipasha and 235 Others SCZ Appeal 1* 189/2016.
5. *Indeni Petroleum Refinery Company Limited v. VG Limited* (2007) Z.R 197.
5. *Zulu v. Avondale Housing Project* (1982) ZR 172

7. *Finance Bank Zambia Limited and Rajan Mahtani v. Simataa Simataa* SCZ Appeal No. 21 of 2017
8. *Nsansa School Inter Education Trust v. Gladys Mtonga Musamba* (2010) Vo Z.R 457

**Legislation referred to:**

1. *The High Court Act, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia*
2. *The Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1965, 1999 Edition (White Book,*

**Other authorities referred to:**

- . *Black's Law Dictionary, 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Thompson and West.*

**1) INTRODUCTION**

- 1 This appeal is against the judgment of Judge Lameck Mwale the High Court Commercial Division. In that judgment, the plaintiff's claims for payment of commission, on the basis of contract between it and the defendant, and damages for breach of contract with interest and costs were granted. The Judge further ordered that the amount due to the plaintiff be assessed by the Registrar. The defendant's counter claim for a set off was also allowed.
- 2 The defendant is now the appellant, whilst the plaintiff is the respondent. We shall refer to the parties by their designations.

in the lower court until we begin to discuss the grounds appeal.

## **0 BACKGROUND**

- 1 In January 2021, the defendant was engaged by the Ministry of Agriculture as a collecting partner for the 2021/2022 Farm Input Support Programme (FISP). The engagement was based on the already existing Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the defendant and the Ministry of Agriculture. The SLA did not specify the fee payable to the defendant.
- 2 In order to actualize the agreement, the defendant signed FISP Collection Agreement with the plaintiff on 21<sup>st</sup> May 2021 for the duration of one year.
- 3 The parties expressly agreed to share the FISP collection fee at the ratio of 80:20, if the per - farmer fee is ZMW15.00 or in the ratio of 75:25, if the per- farmer fee is above ZMW20.00.
- 4 Further, the plaintiff and defendant expressly agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to a commission of 2.5% of the total FISP collected and deposited into a Ministry of Agriculture Account which would be effected after the 2021/2022 farming season on the average collected funds.

- 5 Under the agreement, the plaintiff had obligations to provide inter alia; agents to authenticate and collect farmers' contributions, to transmit cash collected to designated government accounts held with the defendant, to settle agents' fees, paying for security and insurance.
- 5 It was an express term of the Collection Agreement under Clause 5.3.1, that the plaintiff would send invoices to the defendant for its share of the collection fees, every two weeks for the defendant to pay within two weeks. The plaintiff complied with this term. However, the defendant did not settle the invoices. The reason for not paying being that the per farmer fee had not yet been agreed to, between the Ministry of Agriculture and the defendant.
- 7 The plaintiff averred that as a result of non-payment of the commission, it had to borrow money from money lenders at exorbitant interest rates, in order to settle some of the fees owed to the agents that offered services under the contract.
- 3 Under the circumstances, on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2021, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant by way of writ

summons accompanied by a statement of claim. The plaintiff claimed for:

- (1) An order of specific performance instructing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sums ZMW3,126,216.00 and ZMW 2,605,180.00;***
- (2) Damages for breach of contract;***
- (3) Interest on all amounts found due;***
- (4) Any other relief as the Court may deem fit; and***
- (5) Costs.***

- 9 In the amended defence and counter claim filed on 9<sup>th</sup> February 2022, the defendant admitted to having entered into a contract with the plaintiff, as a collecting partner for the 2021/2022 FISP under the SLA between the defendant and the Ministry of Agriculture, on the terms and conditions alluded to by the plaintiff.
- 10 The defendant however, denied having breached the contract and averred that it was impossible to determine the amount payable to the plaintiff, before the collection fee was agreed by the Ministry of Agriculture and/or Ministry of Finance.

- 11 The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim for the sum of ZMW 605,180.00 as commission of 2.5% of the total FISP collected and deposited into the Ministry of Agriculture Account with the defendant. The defendant averred that the claim was made prematurely because the parties had agreed that the said commission was payable at the end of the 2021/2022 farming season.
- 12 The defendant further averred that the plaintiff collected farm contribution fees amounting to ZMW 7,549,478.12, as at 1 January 2022, which it failed or neglected to remit to the defendant. As a result, the defendant made the following counter claim:

***Payment of the sum of ZMW 7,549,497.12 plus a sum's that shall be unremitted as at the date of delivery of the court's judgment, interest, any other relief the court may deem fit and costs.***

- 13 In reply, the plaintiff denied having collected an amount of ZMW 7,549,497.12 on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff disclosed that it collected the sum of ZMW 115,159,600.00

at 11<sup>th</sup> January 2022 and remitted almost all of it to the defendant by 1<sup>st</sup> February 2022.

.14 The plaintiff further averred that it is premature for the defendant to allege that it is entitled to a set-off. Further, an amount of ZMK3,537,097.12 is still under reconciliation between the parties.

.15 The plaintiff denied the counterclaim and averred that upon announcement of the closure of the farming season in October 2021, the plaintiff shut down its system and was no longer collecting the farmer contribution fees owing to lack of payment of its commissions under clauses 5.1 and 5.2 of the FISP Collection Agreement. However, upon being approached by the Ministry of Agriculture, the plaintiff re-opened its system and collected a total of ZMW115,159,600, as farmer contribution fees as at the date of filing the defence and counter claim.

.16 The plaintiff maintained its claim for breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that there has never been a reminder either formally or informally from the defendant to remit an amendment of ZMW7,549.497.12.

- .17 The plaintiff blamed the defendant for the non-remittance part of the funds stating that some of its agents withheld the funds since the plaintiff was unable to pay them owing to the non-payment of the bi-weekly invoices by the defendant.
- 18 The plaintiff averred that prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2022, mobilized itself and collected some funds that were withheld from the agents in the sum of ZMW 4,012,400.00 and remitted the same to the defendant.

## **3 EVIDENCE AT TRIAL**

- 1 Trial took place on 18<sup>th</sup> January 2022. The plaintiff called two witnesses, whose evidence was, to a large extent, a repetition of the averments in the statement of claim.
- 2 Additionally, PW1 Jacqueline Inonge Mupupumi, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the plaintiff company, testified that as at the date of her testimony, the plaintiff had collected the farmer registration fees at ZMW400.00 per farmer from 287,899 farmers nationwide, through its various network agents, without funds or commission from the defendant. That the total sum collected was ZMW115,159,600.00, of which ZMW 111,661,902.00 was deposited into the designated



account with the defendant, save for the money that has been withheld by the agents in protest for non-payment of the salaries. She went on to testify that as at 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2021, closing amount of ZMW 107,044,400.00 was reflecting translating 267,611 farmers. 80% of this aggregated amount at that date, meant ZMK3,126,216.00, was payable to the plaintiff.

- 3 As for the agreed commission of 2.5% of the total FISP collected as at 10<sup>th</sup> August 2021, the total deposits collected by the plaintiff stood at ZMK104,066,180.00. Two and a half per cent (2.5%) of this sum gives an aggregated figure ZMK2,605,180.00, payable to the plaintiff.
- 4 In cross examination, PW1 confirmed that the per - farmer fee was only set in March 2022, at K20.00. She also confirmed that the 2.5% commission was to be effected after the said farming season, which initially ended in October 2021, but was extended to January 2022.
- 5 In re-examination, she clarified that the invoices that were sent to the defendant were based on ZMW15.00 per - farmer fee. This was on the understanding between the parties that the

invoices be based on a fee of ZMW15.00 the minimum amount payable per – farmer as they waited for the fixing of the per farmer fee by the Ministry of Agriculture.

- 5 PW2 was Happy Chisenga Munlo, a Director of Business Administration in the plaintiff company. His evidence will not be rehearsed as it merely confirmed PW1's evidence except that he added that invoices were being sent bi-weekly to the defendant who failed to pay. Further that the 2.5% commission of the total FISP collected deposits was not attached to the non-indicative per - farmer fee and therefore the defendant should have paid the plaintiff in the manner highlighted in the Collection Agreement.

**) DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW**

- 1 Upon considering the pleadings filed by both parties, the oral and documentary evidence presented at trial and the final submissions filed by both parties, the learned trial Judge identified two questions for determination, these being:

***(1) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the payment of transaction fees under clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement.***

***Agreement as per the bi- weekly invoices issued to the defendant; and***

***(2) Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to the commission fee under clause 5.2 of the Collective Agreement at the time of commencement of the action.***

- .2 The Judge found that the background to the case as stated herein before. In addressing the issues in contention, I examined clauses 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 (1) and (2) of the Collective Agreement
- 3 He found that the need for the plaintiff to issue invoices to the defendant for its share of the collection charges to cover operating and logistics expenses was to ensure that the farm fees collection process was not disturbed once it commenced.
- 4 He found that the Collection Agreement took effect on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2021, when the agreement was signed, and it was for the duration of one year according to clause 4.1.
- 5 That, pursuant to clause 5.3.1 of the Collective Agreement, payments were to be made 14 days from the date of receipt of monthly invoices. The intention of the parties was to cushion

the operational and logistical costs the plaintiff would incur during the implementation of the Collection Agreement.

- 5 The Judge further found that according to clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement, the per-farmer fee could only be either ZMW15.00 or ZMW20.00. Since the invoices were issued on the possible minimum fee of ZMW15.00, the Judge held that paying the plaintiff for the work it did, based on the minimum fee would not have prejudiced the defendant in any way. The reliance should not be placed on the SLA because the plaintiff was not privy to it. The Judge held that the rights of the plaintiff under the Collection Agreement cannot be subservient to the SLA.
- 7 The Judge further held that the defendant's obligation to pay the plaintiff was not suspended because the payment was not dependent on the plaintiff's performance of its obligation under the Collection Agreement and not on the setting of the per - farmer fee by the Ministry of Agriculture and /or Finance
- 3 In addition, the setting of the per-farmer fee was not a condition precedent to fulfill the obligation to pay the plaintiff, because the time frame within which to pay was clearly set out

Furthermore, the reason for paying the plaintiff in such manner was expressed in the Collection Agreement, namely “ease operations and logistics expenses.”

9 Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have been paid at the minimum fee of ZMW15.00, even before the performer fee was set by the Ministry of Agriculture or Finance.

10 Consequently, the Judge found that the defendant breached the Collection Agreement by failing to pay the plaintiff its dues.

11 As regards the second question, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the commission fee under clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement at the time of commencement of the action, the Judge looked at clause 5.2 which provides that:

***“The payment shall be effected after the season and the average collection funds.”***

12 He found that it was not in dispute that the 2021/2022 farming season ended in October 2021, but the farmer contribution collection exercise was extended to January 2022. The action was commenced on 16<sup>th</sup> September 2021, before the farming season came to an end.

13 The Judge further found that the plaintiff could not have reasonably been expected to sit back and wait for the season end before making a claim for the commission under clause 5 of the agreement, because the defendant as earlier found, had breached a fundamental term of the Collection Agreement, by not paying the bi-weekly invoices. The Judge therefore held that the plaintiff's claim was not premature but justifiable. He added that, ***"Little wonder the defendant made a payment in court of the sum of ZMW287,901.00 in satisfaction of the plaintiff's cause of action for ZMW2,605,180.00 relating to the 2.5% commission."*** The Judge therefore granted to the plaintiff the said commission under clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement on pro-rata basis at the time of commencement of the action.

14 As regards the counterclaim, the Judge found that the plaintiff had the right to exercise a possessory lien against the funds retained. It was common cause that the plaintiff's agent withheld some monies that were due to the defendant. Therefore, merit was found in the counter claim that the defendant is entitled to the funds withheld by the plaintiff.

agents. In the absence of a certain amount due in this respect, an assessment by the Registrar was ordered. Further, a set – off was ordered.

- 15 In conclusion, the Judge directed *inter alia* that in determining the judgement sum due to the plaintiff, the learned Registrar shall consider the provisions of the Collection Agreement under clauses 5.1 and 5.2 as well as the invoices issued to the defendant.
- 16 The plaintiff was granted damages for breach of contract to be assessed by the Registrar. Interest on the judgment sum due to the plaintiff was granted at the short-term deposit rate from the date of the writ to the date of judgment, thereafter at the commercial bank lending rate as determined by the Bank of Zambia from time to time until full and final settlement. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff and leave to appeal was granted.

## **.0 THE APPEAL**

- .1 The defendant being dissatisfied with the said judgment, has lodged this appeal on the following grounds:

***1. That the court below erred in law and fact by  
delving into the payment into court prior to the***

***determination of all questions of liability and amount of debt or damages.***

- 2. That the court erred in law and fact by making an order for costs without considering the effect of the payment into court on its exercise of discretion to award costs.***
- 3. That the court below erred in law and fact by awarding interest to the respondent without considering the effect of the payment into court on the award of interest.***
- 4. That the court below erred by considering the payment into court as admission of liability by the appellant despite the notice of payment into court having stated that "liability is denied."***
- 5. That the court erred in law and fact when it held that the respondent was entitled to payment of transaction fees under clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement.***



**6. That the court below erred in law and fact when it held that the respondent had proved that it was entitled to the payment of commission under clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement on pro rata basis at the time of commencement of the matter.**

**7. That the court erred in law and fact when it directed that in determining the judgment sum due to the plaintiff, the learned Registrar shall consider the provisions of the Collection Agreement under clauses 5.1 and 5.2 as well as the invoices issued to the appellant.**

**8. That the court below erred in law and fact when it awarded damages to the respondent for breach of contract, the same to be assessed by the learned Registrar.**

## **10 HEADS OF ARGUMENT**

1 The heads of argument filed by both parties are on record. However, a summary of the same will only appear in our analysis and determination below.

**.0 ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION**

- .1 We have reviewed the record of appeal along with the heads of argument submitted by the appellant and the respondent on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2023 and 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, respectively. The grounds of appeal will be addressed as follows: grounds 1 and 4 together, grounds 2 and 3 together. Grounds 5, 6, 7, and 8 separately.

**GROUND 6**

- 2 Starting with ground 6, which deals with the question whether there was a cause of action for recovery of the commission under clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement.
- 3 In the 6<sup>th</sup> ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the claim for commission under clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement was made prematurely because the commission was only payable after the end of the 2021/2022 farming season.
- 4 The appellant contended that the lower court failed in its duty to give effect to the unambiguous agreement between the parties concerning the commission under clause 5.2. The fix

date of payment could not be altered by the Court on the basis that the appellant had breached a fundamental term of the Collection Agreement by not paying the bi-weekly invoices.

- 5 The appellant relied on the case of **Rollop and Colls Limited v. Northwest Metropolitan Hospital Board D**,<sup>1</sup> where it was held *inter alia* that:

***“The court does not make a contract for the parties. The court will not even improve the contract which the parties have made for themselves, however desirable the improvement might be. The court’s function is to interpret and apply the contract which the parties have made for themselves. If the express terms are perfectly clear from ambiguity, there is no choice to be made between different possible meanings; the clear terms must be applied even if the court thinks some other terms would have been more suitable.”***

- 6 The case of **African Banking Corporation Zambia Limited v. Plymth Technical Works Limited & 7 Others**,<sup>2</sup> was relied on

in support of the submission that the lower court failed in its duty to interpret clause 5.2.

- 7 The respondent's position is that considering the breach of contract, the issue of when the payment was to be made is immaterial as it does not alter the intention of the parties regarding the commission payable under clause 5.2.
- 8 Further, the non-payment of the bi-weekly invoices caused financial hardship to the respondent, which was brought to the appellant's attention, as can be seen on pages 158 – 168 of the record of appeal. Therefore, the lower Court was on firmer ground when it found that the respondent could not have been reasonably expected to sit back and wait for the farming season to end when it had several financial obligations to meet.
- 9 The question raised by the appellant is whether the respondent had the right of action or cause of action against the appellant for the 2.5% commission of the total FIC's collected deposits into the Ministry of Agriculture account with the appellant at the time of commencement of the proceeding.

10 **Black's Law Dictionary 8<sup>th</sup> Edition** cited by the appellant defines **"right of action" as the 'right' to bring a specific case to court and "cause of action" as a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suit in a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person."**

11 To determine ground 6, it is imperative that clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement be interpreted following the guidance in **Rollop and Colls Limited** supra. The said clause reads as follows:

***"UBA and M. Ndalama have agreed a commission of 2.5% of the total FISP collected deposits into the Ministry of Agriculture account with UBA. The payment shall be effected after the season on the average collected funds."***

12 This clause is crystal clear. It means that the commission of 2.5% of the total FISP collected and deposited into the Ministry of Agriculture account with UBA, could only be paid to the respondent by the appellant, on the average collected funds after the end of the 2021/2022 farming season. The use of the

word 'shall' in the last part of the clause, indicates that this is a mandatory requirement.

- 13 Therefore, we hold that the appellant had no right to initiate an action under clause 5.2 on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2021, as the farming season had not yet ended.
- 14 Therefore, the lower court misdirected itself in finding that a breach of a fundamental term under clause 5.1, justified premature initiation of an action under clause 5.2. We accordingly set aside that finding. The lower Court failed to interpret clause 5.2 of the agreement.
- 15 Consequently, we set aside the portion of the original action relating to clause 5.2. We leave it open to the respondent to file a fresh lawsuit since the cause of action accrued at the end of the 2021/2022 farming season. We find no merit in ground 3 and uphold it.

#### **GROUND 1 AND 4**

- 16 In both grounds 1 and 4, the appellant is dissatisfied with the lower court's statement on page J22 (paragraph 10.22) of the judgment that: ***"Little wonder the defendant made payment into court of the sum of ZMW287,901.00***

***satisfaction of the plaintiff's cause of action of ZMW2,605,180.00 which relates to the 2.5% commission under Clause 5.2 of the Collection Agreement."***

17 The appellant submitted that the lower Court misdirected itself in the above excerpt because it had not yet dealt with the question of liability and the amount payable to the respondent. The appellant relied on **Order 29 Rules 3 and 4 of the High Court Rules<sup>1</sup> (HRC)** and **Order 22/1/2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England(RSC).**<sup>2</sup>

18 Further, the appellant contended that the lower court erred in considering the payment into court as an admission of liability when the notice of payment into court clearly stated that liability was denied.

19 To counter this, the respondent argued that making a statement that liability is denied does not prevent the Court from making a finding of liability against the maker of the statement. We have examined the following applicable laws:

20 **Order 29 Rule 3 of the HCR** on notice of payment into Court provides that:

***“The notice shall state whether liability is admitted or denied...”***

.21 **Order 29 rule 6 of the HCR** provides that:

***“Except in an action to which a defence of tender before action is pleaded or in which a plea under the Libel Acts, 1843 and 1845 of the United Kingdom, has been filed, no statement of the fact that money has been paid into court under the preceding rules shall be inserted in the pleadings and no communication of that fact shall at the trial of any action be made to the Judge or assessor until all questions of liability and amount of debt or damages have been decided, but the Judge shall, in exercising his discretion as to costs, take into account both the fact that money has been paid into court and the amount of such payment.”***

.22 **Order 22/1/2 of the RSC** describes the nature of a payme into court as simply an offer to dispose of the claim on terms



It further states that: ***“The payment into court implies admission about the merits of the cause of action. There has been no adjudication on it, and therefore no estoppel is created.”***

- 23 Our interpretation of the first part of **Order 29, Rule 6 HCR** is that informing the judge or assessors about the money paid into court before all questions of liability and the amount of debt or damages have been decided is prohibited.
- 24 The second part of **Order 29 Rule 6 HCR** requires a Judge when exercising discretion regarding costs, to consider the money paid into court and the amount of such payment.
- 25 **Order 29 Rule 6 HCR** disallows the parties to state in their pleadings that money has been paid into court. It also precludes the parties from informing the judge or assessors that money has been paid into Court before questions of liability and quantum of damages have been determined.
- 26 The appellant has not demonstrated that at the trial, the fact of the payment into Court was inserted in any pleading or that either party to the case informed the trial Judge about the payment.

- 27 In this jurisdiction, payment into Court cannot be considered to be secret because upon filing a notice of payment into Court, the notice is placed on the Court record for the judge and all parties concerned to see.
- 28 It seems to us that the notice of payment into Court was on the record and the Judge was aware of it. We take the view that the statement referred to from the lower Court's judgment was made *per incuriam*. The liability of the appellant was not solely based on the payment into Court but on the evidence on the record.
- 29 Notwithstanding the foregoing discourse, a trial judge should not comment on payment into Court until all questions of liability, amount of debt, and damages have been decided.
- 30 We agree with the appellant that the lower court should not have considered the payment into court as an admission of liability because under **Order 22/1/2 of the RSC** payment into court is not tantamount to admission of liability for the cause of action.
- 31 For the foregoing reasons, we find merit in grounds 1 and 4 of the appeal.

### **GROUND 2 AND 3**

- 32 Grounds 2 and 3 speak to the effect of the payment made in Court on the awards of costs and interest respectively.
- 33 The appellant relied on **Order 29 Rule 6 HCR** and **Order 6 Rule 9 (1) (b) RSC** whose provisions are similar as they provide that the Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall take into account any payment of money into Court at the amount of such payment.
- 34 On page J25 of the judgment, the Judge ordered *inter-alia* follows:

***“I award costs to the plaintiff to be taxed in default of agreement.”***

- 35 The appellant argued that the learned trial Judge did not consider the payment made by the appellant into court at the amount paid in awarding costs to the respondent.
- 36 On the contrary, the respondent cited the case of **Wooton Central Land Board**,<sup>3</sup> where the Court of Appeal of England stated as follows:

***“It is commonplace in cases which come before this court relating to the exercise of discretion in***

*regard to costs, that the court is very slow indeed to interfere with such exercise. Put in another way, it can be asserted that there is no question of law which this court is competent to determine relating to the exercise of discretion unless it is clearly shown that in the exercise of discretion, the tribunal appealed from has in some material and substantial respect wrongly exercised the discretion, either by some wrong, some erroneous direction of itself as a foundation for the exercise, or... where the result arrived at is one producing in the opinion of this Court a manifest injustice.”*

37 The respondent contended that the appellant had not demonstrated that the lower Court wrongly exercised its discretion in some material way.

38 It is our considered view, that the onus was on the appellant to show that the discretion of awarding costs was in some material or substantial respect wrongly exercised.

39 As we have already stated, **Order 29 Rule 6 HCR** makes it mandatory for the Court in exercising its discretion as to costs

to consider the fact that money has been paid into Court at the amount of such payment. Failure to take this into account is a misdirection that cannot be taken lightly.

.40 **Section 24 (1) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act**, provides that

***“The Court may, on the hearing of an appeal in a civil matter confirm, vary, amend, or set aside the judgment appealed against or give judgment as the case may require.”***

41 We have considered the payment made into Court and found that the appellant paid the sum of ZMW 1,072,518.88 on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2022. As of 14<sup>th</sup> September 2021, when the action was commenced, the amount claimed was a total of ZMW 731,396.00 plus interest. The amount paid into Court was significantly lower than the amount claimed. Considering that the cause of action for the commission under clause 5.2 of the Collection agreement had not arisen at the time, the principal amount claimed was ZMW 3,126,216.00.

.42 We take the view that since the amount paid into Court was significantly lower than the respondent's claim, even if the lower Court had taken into account the amount paid in

Court, the result would have been the same. We are fortified by **Order 22/1/10 RSC** which provides *inter alia* that, the defendant must pay into court a sum that covers not only the debt or damages claimed, but also any interest that might be awarded up to the date of payment. While the defendant is not obligated to pay interest into court, failing to do so puts the plaintiff at risk regarding costs if interest is ultimately awarded, as the amount paid may be deemed insufficient. (Paraphrased).

43 Although the trial Judge did not consider the payment into Court, this does not affect the award of Costs as the amount paid into Court was significantly lower than the amount claimed. Therefore, the discretion of the trial Judge in awarding costs will not be tampered with. The case of **Wootton** applies.

44 As regards the effect of the payment into Court on the award of interest, the appellant stated that the lower court erred in awarding interest to the respondent without considering the effect of the payment into court on the award of interest. Reliance was placed on **Order 22/1/10 of the RSC**.

.45 The appellant also referred us to the case of **BP Zambia Pl**  
**v. Expendito Chipasha and 235 Others**,<sup>4</sup> where the Supren  
Court discussed Order 22/1/8 RSC which provides that:

***“Any interest that may be awarded on the debt or  
damages recovered should be calculated up to the  
date of payment into Court.”***

46 The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in **Zamb**  
**Revenue Authority v Hitech Trading Company Limited**  
**(SCZ Judgment No.40 of 2000)** where it was held that:

***“In any event, the money paid into Court does not  
earn interest, which is a point in favour of the  
appellant in the event they were unsuccessful in  
their appeal.”***

47 On this basis, it was concluded that:

***“Money paid into Court should only attract interest  
from the date of the Writ of Summons to the date  
of payment into Court.”***

.48 In this case, the respondent contended that the amount pa  
into Court was insufficient as the claim was higher as earli  
alluded to.

.49 **Order 22/1/10 RSC**, provides to the effect that the trial Judge may have to make a special calculation of interest at the end of the trial to determine whether the amount paid into court was adequate at the time of payment. This calculation will influence the decision regarding the order for costs (paraphrased).

50 We hold that the award of interest was justified because the respondent was kept out of its money (see the case of **Inde Petroleum Refinery Company Limited v. VG Limited**.<sup>5)</sup>)

51 The lower court ordered interest according to the Judgments Act. However, according to the case of **BP Zambia PLC** supra ***“Money paid into Court should only attract interest from the date of the Writ of Summons to the date of payment into Court.”***

.52 Therefore, the trial court misdirected itself by making a general order for interest on the entire judgment debt due to the respondent, and because of this, we set aside the order for interest on the amount paid into Court. Instead, we order that the money paid into Court by the appellant shall only attract interest from the date of the writ of summons to the date



payment into Court. Interest on any other amount due to the respondent shall attract interest as ordered by the lower Court.

- .53 In light of the preceding, grounds 2 and 3 partially succeed because the award of costs has not been tampered with.

### **GROUND 5**

- .54 In ground 5, the appellant faults the lower court for granting the respondent transaction fees under clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement. The appellant submits that the invoices issued by the respondent were based on a per - farmer fee that was ZMW15.00, when the per – farmer fee was fixed in March 2022, at ZMW20.

- .55 Clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement provides as follows:

***“5.1 M. Ndalama and UBA have agreed to share commission of the FISP collection fee in the ratio 80:20 in favour of M. Ndalama if the per - farmer fee ZMW15.00. Above ZMW20.00 per - farmer the ratio 75:25 in favour of M. Ndalama will apply.”***

- .56 The appellant submitted that the preceding clause is very clear: It provides for payment of commission based on the per

farmer fee yet to be fixed. The invoices issued by the respondent based on the per-farmer fee of ZMW15.00 were therefore incorrect.

57 Further, the appellant's obligation to pay commission under clause 5.1 was suspended until the per-farmer fee was determined. The appellant relied on the case of **Africa Banking Corporation Zambia Limited v. Plymth Technical Works Limited and Others** supra, where it was held that:

*"It is trite that the interpretation of a written document is a matter of law for the court. The function of the court is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words which they have used; to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not of what was intended to have been written; and to give effect to the intention as expressed. The object is to discover the real intention of the parties and the intention must be gathered from the written instrument read in the light of such extrinsic evidence as is admissible for the purpose of construction. It is not permissible to guess*

***the intention of the parties and substitute the presumption for the expressed intention.”***

.58 The respondent submitted that the above authority does not support the appeal. The operative word under clause 5.1 is ‘To state that the invoices were incorrect is merely a ploy to delay payment. It would be logical to conclude that the invoices issued at ZMW15.00 were merely not to stray beyond what the parties had agreed to. Further, the accounts would have been reconciled at the end of the farming season even if the said invoices had been paid. That the contract ought to have been honoured.

.59 We note that the parties had agreed under clauses 5.3, 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 that:

***5.3, “ UBA shall transfer the applicable transaction fee to M-Ndalama either via the “automated model” or by manual instruction.”***

***5.3.1 “by not later than the 14<sup>th</sup> calendar day following the date of receipt of the monthly invoice in the case of clause 5.1 above and by not later than 14***

***calendar day following the end of reconciliation and FISP collected deposits as in clause 5.2 above.”***

***5.3.2 “ M-Ndalama will invoice UBA every two weeks for their share of collections fee to ease operations and logistics expenses.”***

60 It is clear from the above clauses that the parties agreed that the invoices to be issued by the respondent bi-weekly for their share of the per-farmer fees, be based on the minimum per-farmer fee of ZMW15.00 and that the appellant would be paying the same within 14 days from date of receipt of each invoice. This was to assist the respondent with operations and logistics expenses. The respondent performed its part of the contract but there was no payment made on any of the invoices. The appellant’s excuse was that it was waiting for the per-farmer fee to be set by the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Agriculture.

61 Under the circumstances, we agree with the respondent that the parties intended to use the minimum fee of ZMW15.00 per-farmer, as they awaited setting of the per-farmer fee for the season to be fixed by the Ministry of Finance or Ministry

- Agriculture. This makes business sense because the respondent needed funds to continue performing the contract.
- .62 The bi-weekly invoices could not have been at ZMW20.00 per farmer fee during the 2021/2022 farming season because the said fee was not fixed within the season. The fee of ZMW20.00 per-farmer was only set in March 2022, after the end of the farming season which ended in January 2022.
- .63 Therefore, the invoices that were issued by the respondent to the appellant were correct as the appellant was following the agreed terms and conditions. If the same were paid, reconciliation of the accounts would have still been possible and neither party would have been prejudiced.
- .64 There was no agreement between the parties that the per-farmer fee would only be paid after the authorities had fixed the fee. The parties expected the per-farmer fee to be fixed during the 2021/2022 farming season and not later.
- .65 We, therefore, hold that the share of the commission under clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement was not suspended until the authorities set that fee. This means ground 5 has no merit.

## **GROUND 7**

- .66 In ground 7, the appellant challenges the lower court determination that clauses 5.1 and 5.2 and the invoices issued by the appellant should be taken into account in assessing the damages.
- 67 The appellant contends that the respondent deliberately did not produce the invoices in the joint bundle of documents and therefore failed to prove its case. The case of **Zulu Avondale Housing Project**<sup>6</sup> on the principle that the burden lies on the appellant to prove his case, was relied upon.
- .68 To counter ground 7, the respondent submitted that the appellant did not dispute the fact that invoices were given to by the respondent for settlement.
- .69 It was submitted that the appellant will suffer no prejudice if the invoices are produced during the assessment proceedings because they have already received them. Therefore ground 7 is bereft of merit and should be dismissed.
- .70 We observe that although the said invoices were not produced in the joint bundle of documents, it was common ground that the invoices were received by the appellant. Therefore, the

lower court did not err in directing the Registrar to take the into account when assessing the plaintiff's dues. Clause 5 has to be considered as it provides for the share of the commission on the per-farmer fees collected by the respondent.

.71 As we have stated earlier in this judgment, the right to sue under clause 5.2, had not yet accrued at the time the case was commenced, therefore clause 5.2 should not be referred to the Registrar.

.72 It follows that ground 7 partially succeeds.

### **GROUND 8**

.73 In the 8<sup>th</sup> ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the lower Court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract to the respondent, to be assessed by the Registrar. Citing the case **Finance Bank Zambia Limited and Rajan Mhatani Simataa Simataa**,<sup>7</sup> the appellant submitted that the purpose of damages is to put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do so, as if his rights had been observed.

.74 Further, where there is a breach of contract, the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss as was reasonably foreseeable.

.75 The appellant submitted that the award of damages based on clauses 5.1 and 5.2 of the Collection Agreement would suffice. Given the interest awarded, there is no basis for awarding damages beyond the claims under the said provisions.

.76 In response, the respondent stated that its takeaway from the case of **Finance Bank Zambia Limited and Rajan Mhatani Simataa Simataa**,<sup>7</sup> cited by the appellant is that:

***“Damages seek to restore the innocent party to the same economic position that party would have been in had the contract not been breached, thus giving that party the benefit of a bargain.”***

.77 We posit that since the respondent had proved on the balance of probabilities that it lost economic benefits due to the breach of contract; it had to borrow money for logistics and other expenses. It needs to pay interest on the loans. Therefore, interest on the judgment debt alone would not suffice to place the respondent in the same position as if the contract had been performed.



been performed. The respondent aptly claimed damages for breach of contract. See **Finance Bank Zambia Limited and Rajan Mhatani v. Simataa Simataa** *supra*.

78 In the case of **Nsansa School Inter Education Trust v Glad Mtonga Musamba**,<sup>8</sup> the Supreme Court held *inter alia* that:

***“Entitlement to damages can only arise where there has been a proven breach of a valid contract.”***

79 In the present case, the respondent did prove a breach of valid contract and therefore the lower Court was on firm ground to award it damages for the breach, to be assessed by the registrar. Thus, we find no merit in ground 8.

## **8.0 CONCLUSION**


8.1 All in all, the appeal partially succeeds.

8.2 We order that the respondent be paid a commission under clause 5.1 of the Collection Agreement and damages for breach of contract with interest based on the Judgment’s Award.

8.3 We further order assessment of the judgment sum due to the respondent by the Registrar taking into account the invoice.

already issued, and the principles on interest applicable  
the money paid into Court.

- 8.4 Costs awarded to the respondent in the Court below have r  
been tampered with. Each party is to bear its costs befc  
this Court.



.....  
**J. CHASHI**  
**COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE**



.....  
**C.K. MAKUNGU**  
**COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE**



.....  
**N.A. SHARPE - PHIRI**  
**COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE**